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Fashioning an effective international response
to global warming has been a rocky road so
far, and will continue to be in the future. In
1997, international negotiations produced the
Kyoto agreement, aimed at getting countries
to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases.
Given the vicissitudes of global and domes-
tic politics, the implementation of Kyoto has
been halting and contentious. Among many
economists the Kyoto Protocol is something
of an ugly swan. On the one hand, it has a
number of design drawbacks, does not include
countries of the developing world, and pays lit-
tle attention to implementation. On the other
hand, it does represent some action, and it con-
tains “flexibility mechanisms,” like CO2 trad-
ing, that are near and dear to our hearts.
This short book is one of a number of
efforts by economists to critique the agree-
ment and offer improvements. Chapters 2–4
are excellent short summaries covering, re-
spectively, “Science and Uncertainty,” “The
History of International Negotiations,” and
“Why the Kyoto Protocol is the Wrong Ap-
proach.” They would be excellent for students
who are being introduced to global warming
and the vicissitudes of getting an effective in-
ternational response. The subsequent analyti-
cal parts, in which the authors present and dis-
cuss their “hybrid” modification to the Kyoto
agreement, will frustrate economists because
this discussion treats the ramifications of the
plan very lightly. However, having said this,
it should be noted that this book is a policy
brief meant to inform negotiators and policy
makers about some basic ideas without getting
bogged down in lots of details. The authors di-
rect the reader toward their other published
works where these details are discussed.
Their summary of the major failings of
Kyoto is succinct. “It fails to address the deep
uncertainties in climate change; it is designed
around international permit trading, a politi-
cally unrealistic mechanism given the transfers
of wealth that it could cause; it has no viable
mechanism for enforcement; and it contains no
realistic process for increasing participation by
developing countries” (p. 59).
The authors are in the same quandary that
many economists find themselves in: The best
estimates so far appear to indicate that the
costs of any substantial effort to reduce green-
house gases in the developed economies are
likely to be in excess of the long-run benefits of
greenhouse gas reduction. How can we believe
this, but still respond to our natural desires to
do something about it now. Their formula is
to opt for a “prudent” approach in which we
abate emissions where it is possible to do so
at “modest cost” (p. 61), or “when and where
it is cost effective to do so” (p. 39). We can
all believe in cost effectiveness, but what does
“modest cost” mean?
The primary changes the authors would
make to Kyoto are two: (a) do away with in-
ternational trading in emission permits, sub-
stituting a set of individual country cap and
trade programs in which a cap on “long-term”
or “perpetual” emission permits is set at an in-
ternationally negotiated level such as, for ex-
ample, the countries 1990 emissions; (b) add a
provision whereby governments would be em-
powered to sell short-run (one-year) permits to
polluters within their countries at a common,
internationally agreed upon price (the “trigger
price”). Individual firms would be in compli-
ance as long as they held any combination of
perpetual and temporary permits that totaled
at least as much as their emissions. Countries
would collect revenues equal to the number of
temporary permits bought by firms in a year,
times the trigger prices.
The authors are adamant in stressing the
impracticality of an international trading pro-
gram. It would require harmonizing legal
systems more than is realistically possible;
it would lead to excessive wealth transfers
among countries; it would upset international
monetary flows, and it would not result in cost
savings as substantial as its advocates claim.
One might argue whether a system of indi-
vidual sales markets for temporary permits
at an agreed upon international price is any 
more practical. In addition, as more and more 
trading programs are coming off the draw-
ing boards, especially international trading 
schemes in, for example, Europe, this negative 
judgment may have been overtaken by events.
The trigger price scheme for selling short-
run (one-year) permits amounts essentially to 
a greenhouse gas tax that would be applied to 
all emissions over the base, or permanent level. 
On the assumption that all countries estab-
lish internal trading plans, and the assumption 
that actual emissions exceed base or perma-
nent levels, marginal abatement costs would be 
equalized at the trigger price among all sources 
in all countries.
The primary advantage claimed for this hy-
brid scheme is that it would allow countries to 
avoid uncertain abatement costs that turn out 
to be very high. Another advantage claimed 
for their proposal is that it would reduce the 
disincentives countries, especially developing 
countries, have for joining an international 
agreement. This is so because the trigger price 
scheme for temporary permits would limit the 
overall cost of joining, thus countries would 
not run the risk of curtailing growth. They also 
claim greater ease of enforcement, because a 
domestic constituency would develop in par-
ticipating countries to enforce the program in 
order to protect the value of the perpetual per-
mits, and also to be able to raise money from 
selling temporary permits.
The book is an excellent policy brief of their 
plan, good for policy makers and good also 
for economists (especially graduate students) 
who would like to consider the plan and try to 
work out some of its implications and ramifi-
cations. Perhaps the one added element that 
might have added to the book’s value is some 
scenario analysis that would show how the hy-
brid approach they suggest would be better 
than any alternative.
Barry C. Field
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
